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INTRODUCTION
Special Counsel Robert Mueller is conducting an investigation into
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election and the possible
coordination and cooperation with the Donald Trump presidential
campaign.1 The investigation has raised numerous legal questions with
serious political and legal implications.2 Chief among them is whether a
sitting President can be indicted and prosecuted for criminal wrongdoing.3
A related question is whether and to what extent, in the event of an official
*
Former Counsel to the President and the United States Attorney General under the George
W. Bush Administration; Dean and Doyle Rogers Distinguished Professor of Law, Belmont University
College of Law. Special thanks to Dean H. Adams (Juris Doctor Candidate, 2020, Belmont University
College of Law) for his assistance and contributions to this Article. I also appreciate the help of the
editorial staff of the Washington University Law Review.
1.
See OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN
ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS 1 (2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/doc
uments/3254237/Russia-Hack-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KRQ-8ZT2].
2.
David Alan Sklansky with Sharon Driscoll, Espionage, Hacking, and New Indictments: An
Update on the Mueller Investigation, STAN. L. SCH.: LEGAL AGGREGATE (July 20, 2018), https://law.
stanford.edu/2018/07/20/espionage-hacking-and-new-indictments-an-update-on-the-meullerinvestigation/ [https://perma.cc/KKB6-VJEQ].
3.
Salvador Rizzo, Can the President Be Indicted or Subpoenaed?, WASH. POST (May 22,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/05/22/can-the-president-be-indict
ed-or-subpoenaed/ [https://perma.cc/3JSB-YE4T].
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investigation, a sitting President can be compelled to provide evidence—in
the form of oral and written testimony, as well as documentary evidence.4
Finally, assuming there is potential criminal liability, does a sitting
President have the power to issue a self-pardon?5 These are relatively novel
questions in the law, and it is not surprising there is little guidance from the
courts given the reluctance by most judges to weigh in on potentially serious
political questions.6
This Article intends to clarify some of the more difficult legal issues in
our nation’s separation of powers jurisprudence. In order to afford the
President the flexibility and discretion necessary to discharge presidential
duties, the courts are almost certainly going to recognize total immunity
from the criminal process for the President with respect to official conduct.7
The treatment of unofficial conduct is less predictable.8 Based on precedent
and our nation’s founding principles of equal justice and fairness, the courts
are likely to hold that a sitting President is not above the law and thus does
not enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution for unofficial acts or conduct
unrelated to his or her fitness to hold office.9 However, because of
separation of powers considerations, the courts are likely to require deferral
of any such prosecution until the President no longer holds office.10
Although not as clear, constitutional considerations would likely also
require deferral of any investigation or indictment, at least those requiring
the direct and material participation of the President.11 On the other hand,
4.
This question was partly addressed in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974), but
the Court did not reach the issue of compelling a President to respond to subpoenas ad testificandum—
the production of oral testimony.
5.
See Jonathan Turley, Opinion: Does Trump Have Total Power to Pardon? He Just Might,
THE HILL (July 24, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-administration/343408opinion-does-trump-have-complete-power-to-pardon-he
[https://perma.cc/E9DK-JFCR];
contra
Laurence H. Tribe, Richard Painter, & Norman Eisen, No, Trump Can’t Pardon Himself. The
Constitution Tells Us So., WASH. POST (July 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/notrump-cant-pardon-himself-the-constitution-tells-us-so/2017/07/21/f3445d74-6e49-11e7-b9e22056e768a7e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/HH88-MLJR].
6.
This reluctance relates in part to the doctrine that courts should not resolve issues that are
purely political in nature. See generally Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question
Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908 (2015); but see Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question”
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
7.
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982) (holding that the President is absolutely
immune from civil damages suits arising from official presidential conduct).
8.
In terms of civil liability for unofficial conduct, a sitting President is not immune from
litigation while in office. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694–95 (1997).
9.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“No man in this country is so high that he is
above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the
government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.”).
10.
See infra Part I.
11.
Akhil Reed Amar, On Prosecuting Presidents, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671, 676 (1999) (“The
question is not whether a President is accountable to law and to the country—but how, when, and by
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the President can be compelled to produce certain documentary evidence
when doing so is necessary and would otherwise be unavailable in
connection with a criminal investigation.12 The argument for presidential
immunity with respect to production of evidence is stronger, though likely
not absolute, with respect to oral testimony.13 Nonetheless, mindful of the
President’s duties, the courts are likely to afford the President great latitude
in the time, place, and manner of providing oral testimony.14 Finally, there
is nothing in the Constitution that expressly prohibits or limits the President
from issuing a self-pardon.15
I. PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
Our nation was founded on the principle of the rule of law. This means
that the law is applied equally to every person, and no person is above the
law.16 This is one of the foundational tenets of our system of government, a
belief so basic to Americans, so ingrained in our culture, as to be beyond
question or serious disagreement.17 Justice demands that people be held
accountable for their actions.18 Indeed, one could argue that the failure to
prosecute someone in the face of evidence of criminal activity—including
an incumbent President—would undermine confidence in our government
institutions and seriously impair the integrity of the criminal justice
process.19 For these reasons, it may appear obvious that a President who
engages in wrongdoing can be subject to criminal prosecution. It is worth
noting, though, that in our nation’s long history of remarkable yet imperfect
Presidents, none have ever been prosecuted while in office for a crime.20
whom.”). Furthermore, a congressional statute could potentially affect the timing calculation of
indictment. See infra Section I.D.
12.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
13.
See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10130, COMPELLING PRESIDENTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH A JUDICIAL SUBPOENA 2–3 (2018) [hereinafter CRS REPORT],
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10130.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A8S-FPBX].
14.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1997); see also infra Part II.
15.
See infra Part III.
16.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”).
17.
See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2240 (2018)
(“[T]he idea that even the President is not above the law” is “indispensable to a working constitutional
democracy . . . .”).
18.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (the United States is a “government
of laws, and not of men”); Eric M. Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a President
Immune from Criminal Prosecution Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7, 46 (1992).
19.
Daniel J. Hemel & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 CALIF. L. REV.
1277, 1280 (2018).
20.
See Adam Liptak, A Constitutional Puzzle: Can the President Be Indicted? N.Y. TIMES (May
29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/us/politics/a-constitutional-puzzle-can-the-presidentbe-indicted.html [https://perma.cc/B4H4-PDFR]. President Richard Nixon was named a co-conspirator
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A. Distinguishing Official and Unofficial Conduct
Common sense supported by the weight of history tells us that every
President will have to make controversial decisions while in office.21 Those
decisions flowing either directly or indirectly from the President’s duties
and responsibilities under the Constitution and laws of the United States
typically qualify as “official acts.”22 Some official decisions will be
unpopular; still others will give rise to claims of illegality.
Imposing criminal liability upon a sitting President who acts in good
faith, often on the advice of government lawyers, could have a chilling
effect on the President’s decision-making.23 It could paralyze a President
from undertaking controversial measures that he or she considers necessary
to serve American interests.24 Guarding against this paralysis is arguably
more important to the welfare of our nation than imposing criminal liability
to conduct that rarely occurs, especially when there are other adequate
means to hold a President accountable.25 In other words, the interest in
punishing official presidential actions that are taken in good faith but which
some may view as violating the law nevertheless does not outweigh the
significant burden that even attempted criminal prosecution would impose
on the office of the President.26
Additionally, no President can effectively govern or make necessary
personnel decisions if subordinates within the executive branch have the
power to judge, second-guess, or challenge the President’s authority and
decision-making in an official capacity.27 Watergate Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski disagrees, arguing that the government in practice is
supervised through executive departments and agencies without direct

but never indicted. Anthony Ripley, Jury Named Nixon a Co-Conspirator but Didn’t Indict, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 1974, at 73.
21.
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth Presidency and Beyond,
93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 1459 (2009).
22.
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982) (recognizing civil immunity for official
acts, being those “within the ‘outer perimeter’ of [the President’s] official responsibility.”).
23.
Consider, e.g., id. at 751–56.
24.
Id. at 752 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)) (President needs to “deal
fearlessly and impartially with” his official duties).
25.
See id. at 757 (“A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave the Nation
without sufficient protection against misconduct on the part of the Chief Executive.”); see infra Section
I.E.
26.
See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133,
2157 (1998) (contending that “[t]he indictment of a President would be a disabling experience for the
government as a whole”).
27.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (preserving the President’s right to execute his
constitutional duties without impermissible interference by the independent counsel).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3280334

2018]

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

5

presidential supervision.28 While true to a degree, our constitutional
structure of separation of powers places the ultimate power and
responsibility of the executive branch in the hands of the President,29 and he
or she must be able to govern without fear of retaliation or insubordination
by other executive branch officials, including prosecutors at the Justice
Department.30
In the case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a sitting President enjoys complete immunity from civil
liability for actions taken while in office, reasoning that the President must
be able to make decisions and take actions for our country without fear of
civil liability.31 Based on this precedent, courts will likely recognize
absolute immunity from federal criminal process in connection with the
President’s official conduct, which extends to “all acts within the ‘outer
perimeter’ of [the President’s] official responsibility.”32
Fitzgerald itself acknowledges a key textual issue with any argument
supporting presidential immunity: the Constitution contains no express
grant of immunity from liability for the President for either official or
unofficial conduct.33 The absence of an express grant of executive immunity
was significant to Professor Ronald Rotunda, who in 1998, wrote to
Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr that the Constitution explicitly
grants limited immunity to lawmakers for certain actions.34 “If the Framers
of our Constitution had wanted to create some constitutional privilege to
shield the President,” he argued, “they could have drafted such a
privilege.”35 With due respect to Professor Rotunda, our Supreme Court
jurisprudence includes many examples where the Court has found an
implied grant of constitutional authority.36 In Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court
found an implied grant of immunity with respect to official conduct. Thus,
the mere absence of an express grant of immunity to the President in the
28.
Stephen M. Griffin, Presidential Immunity from Criminal Process: Amateur Hour at the
Department of Justice, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 49, 61 (2000).
29.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”).
30.
Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2157–58.
31.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982).
32.
Id.
33.
Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for
Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REV. 879, 928 (1985).
34.
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MEMORANDUM, RE: INDICTABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT 16–18 (1998)
[hereinafter ROTUNDA MEMO], https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/22/us/document-SavageNYT-FOIA-Starr-memo-presidential.html (discussing the arrest clause and speech-or-debate clause).
35.
Id. at 18.
36.
See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (power to regulate
immigration recognized as “being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United
States”); McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 379 (1819) (power of Congress to
incorporate a bank “was not required [to] be expressed in the text of the constitution; it might safely be
left to implication”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
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Constitution does not foreclose the possibility that some form of immunity
from the criminal process exists. What is yet unknown—and what this
Article addresses—is the type and scope of any such immunity or
protection.
Although the President may be “on duty” twenty-four hours a day, he or
she does not engage in official acts twenty-four hours a day.37 As part of
daily living, some conduct is inevitably going to be personal and unrelated
to the duties of the office.38 For example, when the President plays golf with
siblings, clears cedar bush on private property, or goes horseback riding
with long-time friends, he or she is not acting in an official capacity.39
Furthermore, no one can credibly argue that murdering a political rival or
assaulting a media critic would constitute an official duty.40 Likewise, if the
President were to lie to federal prosecutors to protect a family member or
political ally, or take other similar actions to obstruct a legitimate federal
investigation, such conduct would, and should, be characterized as
unofficial.41 While effective governance may depend on the courts’
recognition of absolute immunity for official government actions, the same
need does not exist with respect to unofficial conduct.
In the Supreme Court case of Clinton v. Jones involving personal
conduct by then Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, the Court held that a
sitting President can be subjected to a civil proceeding in federal court and
to civil liability for unofficial actions, such as those taken before assuming
office.42 In part, the decision in Jones depended on the fact that the conduct
at issue was committed before President Clinton took office; for this reason,
the Court classified the conduct as “unofficial acts.”43 It is unclear whether
the Court intended to signal that all conduct prior to taking office were
“unofficial acts,” while all conduct in office were “official acts.”44 Did the
37.
Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS
11, 13 (1997).
38.
See René Reyes, Do Even Presidents Have Private Lives?: The Case for Executive Privacy
as a Right Independent of Executive Privilege, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 508 (2008) (arguing the
President should enjoy greater privacy rights for conduct unrelated to official duties).
39.
See generally GEORGE W. BUSH, 41: A PORTRAIT OF MY FATHER (2014) (recounting the
public and private life of his father, President George H. W. Bush); Ryan Reiterman, Obama’s Final
Tally: 333 Rounds of Golf as POTUS, GOLF CHANNEL (Jan. 20, 2017, 8:05 PM),
https://www.golfchannel.com/article/golf-central-blog/obamas-final-tally-333-rounds-golf-potus/
[https://perma.cc/4TMW-4A6X].
40.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 755 (official duties are those “acts in performance of particular
functions of [the President’s] office”).
41.
Consider, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 686 (1997) (defining actions by President Bill
Clinton prior to being elected as unofficial).
42.
Id. at 692–94.
43.
Id. at 692, 695.
44.
Id. at 692–93.
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Court leave open the possibility that certain conduct, by its very nature,
could still be an unofficial act even when committed by a sitting President?
On the one hand, one could argue that every presidential action or
decision, whether large or small, personal, political, or policy-driven, is an
“official act.”45 Whatever the nature of the activity or motivation may be,
every activity or conduct would necessarily divert the President’s time and
attention from the business of the people, including those that might appear
personal or unofficial. On the other hand, there are clearly certain actions
which by their very nature would be commonly understood to be unrelated
to the President’s official duties.46
The distinction between official and unofficial acts was significant to
Professor Rotunda, who wrote that “it is proper, constitutional, and legal for
a federal grand jury to indict a sitting President for serious criminal acts that
are not part of, and are contrary to, the President’s official duties.”47
Admittedly, depending on the circumstances, it may be difficult to
determine whether conduct is official or unofficial.48 Any test based on the
character or nature of the President’s conduct requires prosecutors and juries
to discern intent and motive, and places judges in the untenable position of
having to second-guess the Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive of
the United States.49 While distinguishing official and unofficial conduct
may prove too difficult for a comprehensive bright-line test, a judge in any
case might simply conclude, “I don’t know where the ultimate line should
be drawn between official and unofficial acts, but it does not matter here.
Clearly, killing someone or lying to federal prosecutors to protect a family
member are not official acts. I don’t have to draw the line for all cases, I just

45.
However, such a definition, if applied broadly enough, could effectively immunize the
President from any number of activities not closely related to his or her official duties.
46.
For example, private moments between a President and spouse and between a President and
the President’s children are likely to be viewed as unofficial, and conduct before assuming office is very
likely to be labelled categorically unofficial. See Jones, 520 U.S. at 686.
47.
ROTUNDA MEMO, supra note 34, at 55 (emphasis added).
48.
It should be noted that the dividing line between official and unofficial conduct has to do
with the nature and functions of the Presidential office and is not dependent on alleged harms or crimes.
For example, former President Bill Clinton was named in a civil complaint that accused him of
conspiring to commit securities fraud. In re Global Crossing, Ltd., 314 F. Supp. 2d 172, 173 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). The district court held that the former President’s actions were official conduct and granted his
motion to dismiss, reasoning that conduct will not be deemed unofficial “merely by reciting that official
acts were part of an unlawful conspiracy”). Id. at 175.
Some commentators note that official conduct can nonetheless implicate other constitutional
principles that further limit the “outer perimeter” of official conduct, such as the Fifth Amendment’s
prohibition on animus in governmental action. See Douglas B. McKechnie, @POTUS: Rethinking
Presidential Immunity in the Time of Twitter, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 19, 22–24 (2017). However, these
theories can lead to constitutional tests that are difficult and arbitrary to implement in practice.
49.
See Freedman, supra note 18, at 47–48 (describing the functional approach the Court often
uses to determine the scope of immunity and official conduct).
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have to draw it for this case.” Courts frequently engage in this kind of factspecific determination.50
A test based on when the conduct occurred appears easier to
administer.51 On balance, however, the right approach to determining
official and unofficial conduct should examine the nature of the conduct as
opposed to the timing of the conduct.52 To hold otherwise would result in a
de facto grant of immunity for all acts, official and unofficial, during a
President’s term in office.53
In determining what crimes the President could be liable for, Special
Prosecutor Jaworski was prepared to recognize an exception for “ordinary
violent crime[s,]” such as murder.54 Such crimes clearly fall outside the
scope of the President’s official duties. Using this reasoning, juries and
judges should be capable of discerning official conduct from non-official
conduct based on common sense and practice. Some cases will be obvious,
others not so. For example, if the presidential conduct at issue is supported
by an express or implied grant of authority in the Constitution or by statute,
based on legal advice by government lawyers, or grounded on court
precedent, then the conduct would fit squarely within the safe harbor of
presidential immunity protection.55 Ultimately, there is a material difference
between official and unofficial acts, and holding the President accountable
for unofficial acts is consistent with our notions of fairness and
accountability.

50.
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524, 533 (1989)) (First Amendment and privacy rights cases require “relying on limited principles that
sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
649 (1993) (“We hold only that, on the facts of this case, appellants have stated a claim sufficient to
defeat the state appellees’ motion to dismiss.”); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (“We
hold only that the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this case . . . did not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
51.
Such a test would categorically deem all conduct prior to assuming office “unofficial
conduct.” See Jones, 520 U.S. at 686 (emphasizing that the conduct at issue “occurred before [the
President] was elected to that office”).
52.
See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (The Court “examine[s] the nature of the
functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and . . . seek[s]
to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate
exercise of those functions.”).
53.
As this Article contends, no person is above the law. A categorical and permanent immunity
for all conduct in which a sitting President engages would place the President above the law; therefore,
a temporal test fails to comport with the rule of law and is rejected.
54.
Griffin, supra note 49, at 59–60.
55.
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 755 (1982) (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483,
498 (1896) (“privilege extends to all matters ‘committed by law to [an official’s] control or
supervision’”).
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B. The Timing of Prosecution for Unofficial Criminal Conduct
Assuming the President is subject to criminal process for unofficial acts,
can a President be investigated, indicted, and prosecuted for such conduct
while in office, or should such prosecution be deferred until the President
no longer holds office? In Clinton v. Jones, the Court concluded that the
burdens of defending against civil litigation in federal court would not
unduly encumber the President in discharging the duties of the office on
behalf of the American people.56 The Court’s conclusion has been the
subject of some debate.57 Even accepting as true the Court’s reasoning with
regard to civil litigation, the burdens are significantly different and more
serious in the criminal justice context due to the risk of incarceration or loss
of civil liberties.58 Admittedly, if a private party can sue a sitting President
for unofficial acts, then one could argue that an indictment and prosecution
is constitutional because the public interest in criminal cases are generally
greater.59 Such an argument, however, fails to consider the wide gamut of
competing interests at issue with regard to prosecuting a sitting President.
The government’s official position is set out by the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Department of Justice (the “OLC”) in two legal opinions,
one published in 1973, and the other published in 2000.60 In the latter
opinion, the OLC opined “that the indictment and criminal prosecution of a
sitting President would unduly interfere with the ability of the executive
branch to perform its constitutionally assigned duties.”61 This conclusion
reaffirmed the OLC’s understanding, expressed in the earlier opinion, and
reinforces this Article’s determination that the President’s official acts are
subject to total immunity.62
The two OLC opinions make clear that allowing the prosecution of a
sitting President, even for unofficial acts, would violate separation of
powers by essentially giving the judiciary the power through the criminal
justice process to dictate the President’s schedule and priorities—a power
that in extreme cases could effectually constitute a de facto removal of the

56.
Jones, 520 U.S. at 705.
57.
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Trump’s Precedent for Claiming Immunity? Clinton v. Jones, N.Y.
TIMES, April 3, 2017, at A10 (noting the debate between scholars and President Trump’s administration
as to scope of executive immunity).
58.
RANDOLPH D. MOSS, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM, A SITTING PRESIDENT’S
AMENABILITY TO INDICTMENT AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, 24 OP. O.L.C. 222, 251–52 (2000)
[hereinafter “2000 OLC MEMO”].
59.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754.
60.
ROBERT G. DIXON, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM, AMENABILITY OF THE
PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT AND OTHER CIVIL OFFICERS TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION WHILE
IN OFFICE (1973) [hereinafter “1973 OLC MEMO”]; 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58.
61.
2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58.
62.
1973 OLC MEMO, supra note 60, at 32.
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sitting President.63 Allowing a federal prosecutor and grand jury to indict
and try the President gives them a position of control over a branch of
government that was never contemplated by our Founders.64
The President is certainly unique in our constitutional structure, unlike
any other public official in the extent of control of one branch of our federal
government.65 In the “Bork Brief”—a memorandum of law filed by
Solicitor General Robert H. Bork—Mr. Bork argued that Vice President
Spiro Agnew was subject to criminal prosecution but that the President was
not subject to such criminal prosecution because of his unique constitutional
role.66 It must be noted that any investigation of a President is almost certain
to become public; the media scrutiny alone will place a great deal of stress
on the White House. Depending on the circumstances and the methods
employed by investigators and prosecutors, an investigation and indictment
could be very distracting for a sitting President.67
Some commentators argue that a criminal proceeding implicating the
President is no more disruptive to the work of the government than
impeachment proceedings.68 Thus, they assert there is no reason that a
criminal prosecution would or should constitute an improper disruption or
removal from office in violation of separation of powers.69 This assertion is
undercut by the fact that impeachment is expressly contemplated in the
Constitution as a means to remove a President.70 In fact, as every first-year
law student learns, other than the procedures set out in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to our Constitution, impeachment is the only method explicitly
included in the Constitution as a means to remove a President from office.71
63.
See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1997) (explaining that amenability to civil suit
does not preclude need to “accommodate [the President’s] busy schedule”); see also id. at 713 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (reasoning that interference with President’s duties equivalent to interference with
schedule of entire Congress or Judiciary). The President has arguably the most complex, significant, and
time-sensitive duties of any federal officer under the constitutional scheme. Kavanaugh, supra note 21,
at 1459–60.
64.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The judges can exercise no executive
prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock . . .”).
65.
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (“The President occupies a unique position
in the constitutional scheme.”).
66.
Robert H. Bork, Memorandum, In Re Proceedings of The Grand Jury Impaneled December
5, 1972: Application of Spiro T. Agnew Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965
(D. Md. 1973) [hereinafter BORK BRIEF]. This source was made available in Eric M. Freedman, On
Protecting Accountability, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 775 (1999).
67.
Kavanaugh, supra note 21, at 1461 (“Even the lesser burdens of a criminal investigation—
including preparing for questions by criminal investigators—are time-consuming and distracting.”).
68.
Freedman, supra note 66, at 707.
69.
Id.
70.
U.S. CONST. art II, § 4.
71.
See CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 371
(5th ed. 2016).
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On the other hand, at least one former Department of Justice official
believes that since Vice President Aaron Burr was indicted while in office
for conspiracy to create an independent country in the southwestern United
States,72 there should be no different rules for a President.73 But anyone with
direct knowledge of the role and responsibilities of a Vice President can
appreciate the possible different treatment because of the vast difference
between serving as President and serving as Vice President.74
Given the present highly politicized environment in Washington, D.C.,75
an indictment and prosecution of a sitting President would likely result in a
major and potentially lengthy disruption of an entire branch of
government.76 In recognition of the unique role of the President as head of
the executive branch, any prosecution of a sitting President in connection
with unofficial acts should be deferred until such time as the President no
longer holds office.77 While investigation and indictment would be of great
interest to the public and Congress, if such actions require the direct and
material participation of the President, they should likewise be deferred
unless such actions have been specifically authorized by Congress.78
In rejecting this proposition, one commentator suggests that the national
public would not necessarily suffer following the successful prosecution of
the President because the presidency could still be conducted from a jail
cell.79 Yes, the President would still be physically able to discharge the
duties of the office. However, images of the leader of the free world
operating from prison would undoubtedly diminish the stature of the office
and undercut this nation’s reputation and standing in the world.80 It would
likely embolden our enemies.
Other scholars remind us that there are multiple remedies to fill the
vacuum created by an incapacitated President, such as presidential
succession, delegations of power, and replacement under the Twenty-Fifth
72.
See generally CHARLES F. HOBSON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE AARON BURR
TREASON TRIAL (2006).
73.
Brianne Biggiani, Designs for Immunity: A Comparison of the Criminal Prosecution of
United States Presidents & Italian Prime Ministers, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 209, 234 (2006).
74.
Kavanaugh, supra note 21, at 1459.
75.
See Avery Anapol, Ted Olson: Trump Turmoil ‘Beyond Normal’, THE HILL (Mar. 26, 2018,
3:42 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/380330-gop-attorney-who-turned-down-offerto-join-trump-legal-team-rips [https://perma.cc/92NB-FJN5].
76.
Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 12.
77.
Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2157.
78.
Id. at 2157–58.
79.
Freedman, supra note 66, at 708 (“[I]t may indeed be possible to conduct the Presidency
from a jail cell.”).
80.
See 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 250–51; but see Examining the Extent to Which a
Sitting President Should Be Subject to Indictment or Other Compulsory Criminal Process: Hearing
Before Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 24 (1998) [hereinafter “1998 Subcomm. Hearing”] (statement of Eric M. Freedman, calling
“the jail issue . . . largely a bogeyman”).
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Amendment of the Constitution.81 They posit that our Founders anticipated
irregular changes or interruptions in the office of the President and put in
place contingencies to respond to such vacancies.82 The Rotunda Memo
argues that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which allows for temporary
replacement of a President who is unable to carry out the duties of the office,
provides a mechanism that would keep the executive branch operational if
the President were on trial.83
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was intended to apply to situations where
the President is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office”
because of some inability.84 The amendment does not define “unable to
discharge” or “inability,” and so provides flexibility to the constitutional
decision makers at a time of crisis in terms of reasons for removal.85 One
must concede that the language of the amendment appears broad enough to
(1) allow an imprisoned President to voluntarily transfer power and (2)
allow the constitutional decision makers—if they deemed it necessary—to
forcibly remove the President should he or she be imprisoned while in
office.86 Technically, however, the President would not be disabled or
unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office. Whether the framers
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment intended it to apply to cases where
81.
See, e.g., David Chaiken, US Presidents Are Not Immune from Criminal Prosecution,
LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2017, 1:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/950167/us-presidents-are-notimmune-from-criminal-prosecution.
82.
See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 18, at 55–56.
83.
ROTUNDA MEMO, supra note 34, at 33.
84.
“Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV,
§ 3.
85.
See Freedman, supra note 18, at 51–59. Freedman argues that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
is a practically limitless method of presidential removal, contingent upon little more than procedural
requirements and a sufficient congressional vote. Id. at 54–56. However, Freedman’s argument has yet
to be seen in history since each use of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment removal power has been exercised
for the purposes of removing a President for physical disability. See Symposium, Fifty Years After the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations for Improving the Presidential Succession System, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 918, 926–27 (2017); see also THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 431
(Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005).
86.
The Constitutional text provides that:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
Professor Freedman argues that such a narrow interpretation of inability is more applicable with
regard to section four than section three. Freedman, supra note 18, at 55.
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imprisonment has impeded but not entirely precluded the President’s ability
to discharge the powers and duties of the office remains a legitimate
question.87
The OLC opinions recognize a “temporary immunity” from liability.88
The concept of a temporary immunity from liability is not one commonly
used or found in the law.89 For that matter, use of the term “immunity” has
caused some confusion among commentators.90 The OLC opinions
unequivocally conclude that a sitting President enjoys total and complete
immunity from liability in connection with official actions.91 Furthermore,
the OLC opinions are consistent with the position that any criminal liability
of the President for unofficial actions should also be temporarily stayed or
deferred until the President no longer holds office.92 Technically, there is no
immunity for the President for unlawful unofficial conduct, which squares
with the principle that no man is above the law.93 The end result under the
OLC opinions is that the President is accountable for his or her unlawful
unofficial conduct, but not subject to prosecution until after he or she has

87.
See 1998 Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 80, at 207 (statement of Professor Susan Low
Bloch) (contending that the 25th Amendment is not appropriate when the President is imprisoned yet
otherwise physically and mentally competent).
88.
2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 238. The 1973 OLC Memo recognizes the concept of
deferral of prosecution; however, it is discussed in the context of indictment during the President’s term
and deferral of prosecution until after office. 1973 OLC MEMO, supra note 60, at 29. Although the 1973
OLC Memo acknowledges that, in theory, such a process could “minimiz[e] direct interruption of
official duties,” it ultimately rejects the idea, reasoning that a lingering indictment “would damage the
institution of the Presidency virtually to the same extent as an actual conviction.” Id.
89.
Examples of courts recognizing a temporary immunity are, admittedly, few and unrelated.
See, e.g., Iron Bear v. Jones, 32 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Neb. 1948) (failure to execute a prisoner on day
scheduled creates only temporary immunity from execution until new date is scheduled); In re Herron,
73 A. 599, 599 (N.J. 1909) (temporary immunity from execution for “mentally deranged” prisoner until
the prisoner recovers sanity); J.W. Field Co. v. Franklin, 499 A.2d 251, 258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1985)
(temporary immunity against certain builder’s remedy suits while municipality revises ordinances);
Goot v. Bd. of Educ., 440 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (upholding state statute providing
temporary immunity from civil suits for soldiers on active duty).
90.
See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities:
The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1995) (distinguishing between “permanent” and
“temporary” immunity in civil suits). While the Supreme Court ultimately decided not to defer litigation
in Jones, see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), Amar and Katyal’s argument remains helpful in
distinguishing permanent immunity from the type of “temporary immunity from such criminal process”
that the 2000 OLC Memo proposed. See 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 238. Certainly, the idea of
permanent immunity for unofficial criminal conduct most strongly offends the rule of law. However, a
temporary “immunity”—what this Article refers to as “deferment”—places the President under the rule
of law in such a way as to hold him or her accountable without destroying deeply rooted notions of
separation of powers and constitutional executive obligations.
91.
2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 222 (“[I]ndictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting
President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its
constitutionally assigned functions.”).
92.
Id. at 238 (recognizing “a temporary immunity from such criminal process while the
President remains in office.”).
93.
See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 261 (1882).
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left office.94 In this important respect, the OLC opinions and this Article are
in total agreement.
One former federal prosecutor has publicly questioned the impartiality
and quality of the legal work of the OLC, observing that OLC memoranda
are not traditional legal analyses and arguing that because the lawyers in the
OLC serve the executive branch, they are inherently biased.95 The fact
remains, however, that OLC opinions represent the formal legal position of
the entire Justice Department and are binding upon all Department of Justice
prosecutors unless and until an opinion is withdrawn by the OLC or
countermanded by the President or Attorney General.96 Those who question
the impartiality of the lawyers in the OLC fail to appreciate that the Attorney
General is charged by statute to provide legal advice to the executive branch,
and has delegated this statutorily-provided authority to the lawyers in the
OLC.97
How the Supreme Court would ultimately answer this question of
presidential immunity and possible deferment of prosecution is unclear.
Both Special Prosecutor Jaworski and Independent Counsel Starr reportedly
concluded that a sitting President could be indicted and prosecuted for
unofficial acts.98 It appears that their determinations were based largely on
the origins of their statutory authority from Congress.99 Although a
congressional statute cannot override the constitutional protections and
rights of a President, courts will give weight to formal congressional actions
when determining the scope of presidential power and authorities.100 In the
case of the Russia investigation, for example, the authority of Special
Counsel Mueller flows directly from that of the Department of Justice and
Deputy Attorney General.101 Consequently, Special Counsel Mueller is
bound by the operative Justice Department views as to whether a sitting
President can be prosecuted while in office. Based on the few relevant court
94.
See 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 238.
95.
Chaiken, supra note 81.
96.
Office of Legal Counsel, General Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2017).
97.
28 U.S.C. §§ 510–513 (2017); Office of Legal Counsel, General Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.25
(2017).
98.
See ROTUNDA MEMO, supra note 34, at 55 (concluding that independent counsel Starr had
the constitutional authority to indict and prosecute President Bill Clinton); CARL B. FELDBAUM, ET AL.,
STAFF MEMORANDUM TO LEON JAWORSKI 20 (1974) [hereinafter JAWORSKI STAFF MEMO] (concluding
that the Grand Jury had probable cause and authority to indict President Nixon), available in Freedman,
supra note 66, at 728–49.
99.
See ROTUNDA MEMO, supra note 34, at 2 (“Nor do I consider whether the President could
be indicted if there were no Independent Counsel statute.”).
100. See Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2157.
101. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL TO
INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RELATED
MATTERS, ORDER NO. 3915-2017 (2017).
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decisions and the views of the Justice Department,102 the courts are likely to
conclude that the President of the United States can be criminally liable for
unofficial acts but cannot be prosecuted until after leaving office because of
separation of powers concerns.103
Deferring an investigation or indictment could be problematic.104 On the
one hand, delaying the investigation increases the risk that evidence is lost,
destroyed, or grows stale. Witnesses may die or become unavailable.105
Memories become weaker over time.106 Additionally, delaying an
investigation may deny Congress information relevant to assessing whether
impeachment and removal is warranted.107
On the other hand, an investigation and subsequent indictment is likely
to disrupt the work of the White House and divert the President’s
attention.108 Arguably, the indictment of a sitting President would usurp the
role of the House of Representatives under the Constitution to bring charges
against a President for high crimes and misdemeanors.109 Any investigation
102. See 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 238 (recognizing a “temporary immunity”); see
generally Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (no immunity from civil damages suits for unofficial
acts); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (absolute immunity from civil damages suits for official
conduct); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (qualified immunity for compliance with
subpoena duces tecum).
103. Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 11.
104. When pressing questions of constitutional law come before the Court, especially those
concerning separation of powers and the President, they often grant certiorari on an expedited basis. See,
e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687 (Supreme Court recognizing “the public importance of the
issues presented and the need for their prompt resolution”). However, in a case where the question is
whether the sitting President can be indicted or prosecuted, the question is not whether the President is
guilty but whether such criminal process may proceed. Thus, the Court could promptly answer the
preliminary question and then determine—as this Article argues—that criminal process should be
deferred until the President is no longer in office.
105. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972). Note, however, the unique situation in Barker.
The defendant was indicted on September 15, 1958, for the death of an elderly couple on July 20th
earlier that year. Id. at 516. During the course of the criminal proceedings, the prosecution obtained a
total of 16 continuances, and the defendant was tried a total of six times, before being found guilty for
the murder of one victim during the fifth trial and guilty for murdering the other victim at the sixth trial
in December 1962—almost four and a half years after the murder. Id. at 516–17. The Supreme Court
held that the defendant “was not deprived of his due process right to a speedy trial.” Id. at 536. The Court
reasoned that “any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the
particular context of the case . . . .” Id. at 522. In fact, the Court explained “that deprivation of the right
may work to the accused’s advantage” and thus “does not per se prejudice the accused’s ability to defend
himself.” Id. at 521.
106. See generally Graham M. Davies, Contamination of Witness Memory in Theory and Practice,
35 MED. SCI. & L. 95 (1995) (reviewing research literature on witness contamination and its effect on
memory).
107. See Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2156 (“[A]ny information gathered with respect to
executive branch officials that could reflect negatively on their fitness for office should be disclosed to
Congress . . . .”).
108. In addition to the disruptive nature of such an investigation and indictment, the highly
politicized nature of such an investigation and indictment would likely call into question the Special
Counsel’s motives in bringing charges. See id. at 2157.
109. “The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
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by state prosecutors will implicate federalism concerns, as discussed below.
Therefore, unless Congress passes a statute authorizing an investigation of
a sitting President for unofficial acts,110 the arguments for proceeding with
an investigation and possible indictment do not carry significant weight
when compared to the significant burden on the office of the President that
would result.111
A final but related question is whether the President can be prosecuted
while in office for crimes committed before becoming President. Such
conduct would, of course, constitute an unofficial act.112 Unlike for civil
offenses, the weight of authority suggests the President cannot be
prosecuted while in office for the reasons set forth above. Deferring criminal
liability for conduct as a private citizen may seem inconsistent with the
imposition of civil liability on a President for conduct prior to assuming
office.113 The differing treatment is justified by the nature of the criminal
proceedings and may be attributable to the additional time and attention a
criminal trial would require of the President.114 Of course, the analysis might
be different if Congress were to pass legislation authorizing prosecution
under these circumstances.115 Finally, irrespective of the President’s
liability while in office, the President could be prosecuted for such crimes
after leaving office.
C. Federalism Concerns: State Prosecution of a Sitting President
The question of presidential immunity and the deferment of prosecution
also raises federalism-type considerations. If a President can be prosecuted
for unofficial acts by federal prosecutors, then state and local prosecutors
would, theoretically, have similar authority with respect to presidential
unofficial conduct in violation of state and local laws.116 States have a strong
public interest in prosecuting criminal wrongdoing by anyone in their
110. See, e.g., Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2157 (proposing statutory language for Congress to
temporarily immunize the President from investigation and indictment in order to address structural and
functional concerns attendant on investigation and indictment of a sitting President).
111. Thus, the courts are likely to require that any investigation or indictment requiring or
involving the President’s direct and material participation be stayed. See 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note
58, at 238.
112. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 686 (1997) (“[I]t is perfectly clear that the alleged
misconduct of petitioner was unrelated to any of his official duties as President of the United States and,
indeed, occurred before he was elected to that office.”).
113. See id. at 694–95.
114. 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 229.
115. Kavanaugh, supra note 21, at 1461.
116. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Trump Can’t Escape the States, SLATE (July 21, 2017, 2:09
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/no_matter_who_he_fires
_or_pardons_trump_won_t_be_able_to_escape_state_attorneys.html [http://perma.cc/ME2A-4HLL].
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jurisdiction, including wrongdoing by the President. It is not hard to imagine
a local or state prosecutor bringing criminal charges against an unpopular
President in order to advance his or her own political career. 117 Having to
defend against these kinds of shenanigans would undoubtedly distract the
President from the business of the American people.118
One opponent of temporary immunity and prosecution deferral has noted
that “the state courts have uniformly ruled that officers who are subject to
impeachment are also subject to indictment while still in office, and that
states in fact regularly bring criminal proceedings against their
officeholders.”119 While true, this argument fails to recognize the federalism
issues inherent in a state prosecution of a federal officeholder.120 Further,
this argument fails to acknowledge that states are separate sovereigns with
their own unique constitutional schemes.121 In Texas, for example, the state
Attorney General is a constitutional officer elected statewide, separately
from the Governor.122 Unlike the U.S. Attorney General who is appointed
by the President and serves in the President’s cabinet,123 the Texas Attorney
General is not part of the Governor’s cabinet or staff, and is not expected to
carry out the Governor’s law enforcement priorities and polices.124
Therefore, relying on the decisions of state courts with respect to the
prosecution of state executive branch officials is neither relevant nor helpful
in determining whether the President is or should be immune from federal
prosecution.
The New York state investigations against the President pending at the
time of publication of this Article place front and center the question of
whether a state may prosecute a sitting President.125 No state has ever
attempted directly to do so.126 The closest example is when Vice President

117. See Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s Misbehaving Prosecutors, and the System
That Protects Them, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2013, 2:18 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/201
3/08/01/prosecutorial-misconduct-new-orleans-louisiana_n_3529891.html [http://perma.cc/S25W-NZ
ZG] (updated Dec. 6, 2017) (discussing prosecutorial misconduct in the United States).
118. Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 14.
119. Freedman, supra note 66, at 699.
120. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 18, at 38 n.90 (listing several state prosecutions of state
officeholders).
121. See, e.g., Jeffrey Omar Usman, The Game is Afoot: Constitutionalizing the Right to Hunt and
Fish in the Tennessee State Constitution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 57, 96–104 (2009).
122. TEX. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1–2; but see TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-101 (2018) (Tennessee
Attorney General appointed by Supreme Court).
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2017).
124. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
125. See Natasha Bertrand, New York Prosecutors May Pose a Bigger Threat to Trump Than
Mueller, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/newyork-prosecutors-allen-weisselberg-trump/568516/ [https://perma.cc/G3QG-58KS].
126 Garrett Epps, The Only Way to Find Out If the President Can Be Indicted, THE ATLANTIC (May
23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/presidential-indictment/560957/ [http://
perma.cc/V9T9-RBT8].
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Aaron Burr was indicted by two states in 1804.127 However, as noted
elsewhere, there is a serious difference between the role and responsibilities
of the President and the Vice President and how they are treated in our
constitutional structure.128
Scholars Akhil Reed Amar and Brian C. Kalt argue that the Supreme
Court case of McCullough v. Maryland stands for the proposition that states
cannot use their power to obstruct the duties of federal agents.129 In
McCullough, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that state officials may not
obstruct the “measures of a government created by others as well as
themselves, for the benefit of others in common with themselves. The
difference is that which always exists, and always must exist, between the
action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on the whole.”130 At
issue here is the concern that one part of the United States would have the
power to derail the entire functioning of the nation as a whole.131
As with the other issues considered in this Article, there is no judicial
precedent on the question of state prosecution of a sitting President.132
Nevertheless, based on the arguments supporting total federal immunity for
official conduct, the President almost certainly enjoys total immunity from
state prosecution in connection with official conduct.133 Furthermore,
because of federalism concerns, any and all state prosecutions against a
sitting President for unofficial conduct will likely be stayed or deferred until
the President no longer holds office.134 Any state investigation or indictment
directly requiring the President’s time and attention would likely also not be
permitted. In concluding that a President is immune from state prosecution
127. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (the Burr treason trial); United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 190 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (the Burr misdemeanor trial); see also BORK
BRIEF, supra note 66, at 12.
128. See Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 12–14; see also Symposium, supra note 85, at 926 (“Prior
to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the country was without a Vice President on many
different occasions, the length of these vacancies totaling over thirty-seven years.”).
129. Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 13–14; see also Keith King, Indicting the President: Can a
Sitting President Be Criminally Indicted?, 30 SW. U.L. REV. 417, 424–25 (2001).
130. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435–36 (1819).
131. Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 13–16. Recall that the privilege is tied to the “performance
of particular functions of [the President’s] office” and not the President’s private interests. Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 755 (1982). See Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 14 (“[T]his privilege is not
designed to protect the President’s personal interests (although it does, temporarily), but rather the public
interest of the People . . . .”). Of course, the same reasoning would not apply to any of the President’s
private organizations or businesses since none hold federal office.
132. Perhaps the closest historical case, other than the Burr trials, was that of President Nixon who
was named an unindicted co-conspirator. See Liptak, supra note 20.
133. See Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 13–16.
134. See Amar, supra note 11, at 671 (reiterating the conclusion that “a sitting President is
constitutionally immune from ordinary criminal prosecution—state or federal—but is of course subject
to ordinary prosecution the instant he leaves office”).
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while in office, Amar and Kalt rely on a structural argument, specifically
that the criminal prosecution of a sitting President would divert the
President from his or her constitutional duties.135 Of course, this obstruction
would occur regardless of whether the prosecution is by state or federal
authorities.136 However, because federalism concerns would no longer exist
once the President leaves office, the states would then be free to
prosecute.137
D. Confronting the Statute of Limitations Problem
There remains the worrisome complication of the running of the statute
of limitations and the possibility that by “running out the clock,” a President
could effectively escape accountability.138 The 1973 OLC Opinion
addresses this issue:
In suggesting that an impeachment proceeding is the only appropriate
way to deal with a President while in office, we realize that there are
certain drawbacks, such as the running of a statute of limitations
135. Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 13–16.
136. Id.
137. As of the publication of this Article, President Donald Trump has been named in a state
defamation lawsuit by former “The Apprentice” contestant, Ms. Summer Zervos. Tyler Pager, Lawyers
for Trump back in Court, Fighting Another Defamation Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2018, at A28.
However, the authority to sue the sitting President in state court for civil matters based on the President’s
unofficial conduct is unknown. While Jones held that sitting presidents are not immune from civil suits
brought in federal court during their term for conduct unrelated to their official duties, Justice Stevens
left undecided whether the same conclusion would be reached in a state court. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.
681, 691–92 (1997). In dictum, Justice Stevens reasoned that if Ms. Jones had brought her case in state
court, then she would “presumably rely on federalism and comity concerns, as well as the interest in
protecting federal officials from possible local prejudice that underlies the authority to remove certain
cases brought against federal officers from a state to a federal court.” Id. Justice Stevens’s federalism
consideration finds grounding in McCullough, discussed supra, based on the notion that states may not
interfere with legitimate federal objectives. See generally McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819). However, one problem with a federalism argument in this context is that the state takes a
more neutral role in civil litigation than it does when acting as prosecutor in a criminal case. In other
words, the state is less actively interfering with the President’s objectives when serving as a mere forum
for the hearing of private complaints. Furthermore, by downplaying the probability of civil suits against
a sitting President, Justice Stevens rejected President Clinton’s immunity argument that a “deluge” of
litigation in federal court for unofficial presidential conduct would “engulf the Presidency,” thereby
disrupting the President’s official duties. Jones, 520 U.S. at 701–02. Thus, having been rejected in the
context of private civil litigation in federal court, state courts may find it easier to reject immunity with
respect to state civil litigation. However, it also appears that civil litigation involving the sitting President
is more common today than when Jones was decided. See, e.g., Matt Viser, Trump Has Been Sued 134
Times in Federal Court Since Inauguration, BOSTON GLOBE (May 5, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2017/05/05/trump-has-been-sued-times-federal-courtsince-inauguration-day/E4AqZBYaKYHtzwfQ3k9hdM/story.html [https://perma.cc/HQB4-CBCG].
On balance, while concerns over separation of powers and federalism may be different, the Jones
decision could well carry significant weight in a state proceeding faced with this issue. With that said,
the analysis might be different if Congress passes a statute that gives jurisdiction to state courts to hear
such cases or otherwise provides immunity.
138. See Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2157; see also Kavanaugh, supra note 21, at 1462 n.32.
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while the President is in office, thus preventing any trial for such
offenses. In this difficult area all courses of action have costs and we
recognize that a situation of the type just mentioned could cause a
complete hiatus in criminal liability. We doubt, however, that this gap
in the law is sufficient to overcome the arguments against subjecting
a President to indictment and criminal trial while in office.139
Similar to the 1973 OLC Opinion, the 2000 OLC Opinion concludes that
the statute of limitations concern is not one of “significant constitutional
weight” when compared to the significant burdens that indictment and
prosecution would impose on the office of the President.140 The opinion
goes on to suggest that Congress could enact a special tolling provision for
this scenario.141 Congress has never done so, likely believing that the need
for such legislation is so remote as to not be worth the effort to try to pass
it.142 Justice Brett Kavanaugh proposed such a provision in a 1998 article.
“The President of the United States,” he wrote, “is not subject to indictment
or information under the laws of the United States while he serves as
President. The statute of limitations for any offense against the United States
committed by the President shall be tolled while he serves as President.”143
States could also pass a similar tolling statute.144

139. 1973 OLC MEMO, supra note 60, at 32.
140. 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 256.
141. Id.
142. See Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2157. Prior to the final Senate vote on Justice Brett
Kavanaugh’s appointment to the Supreme Court, Senator Susan Collins provided a statement on her
evaluation of Justice Kavanaugh and mentioned that his proposal of statutory language to temporarily
shield the President from prosecution “suggests that [Kavanaugh] believes that the President does not
have such protection currently.” Abigail Abrams, Here’s Sen. Susan Collins’ Full Speech About Voting
to Confirm Kavanaugh, TIME (Oct. 5, 2018), http://time.com/5417444/susan-collins-kavanaugh-votetranscript/ [https://perma.cc/67MT-HWB6] (providing a transcript of Senator Collins’s statement).
Senator Collins further stated that she had spoken at length with the then-D.C. Circuit Judge on two
separate occasions regarding his judicial views on various topics. Id. While Justice Kavanaugh’s
statements during those private conversations cannot be verified, a thorough reading of his articles
suggests that he held a much different view—that the Independent Counsel Statute’s grant of vast
prosecutorial power created uncertainty as to whether the counsel could prosecute the President,
precipitating the need for a statutory amendment to address the ambiguity and clear any doubt. See
Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2135 (enumerating “[s]everal “problems” with the statute, including its
authorization of the “independent counsel [to] investigate matters beyond the initial grant of
jurisdiction”). Thus, Justice Kavanaugh’s concern was with the ambiguity of the Independent Counsel
Statute, not with the Constitution. Leaving little doubt as to his position, Kavanaugh concluded that the
Constitution itself proscribes judicial prosecution of a sitting President: “Thus, as the Constitution
suggests, the decision about the President while he is in office should be made where all great national
political judgments in our country should be made—in the Congress of the United States.” Id. at 2159.
143. Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2157.
144. Of course, practically speaking, only a few jurisdictions would likely see the need to pass
such a statute (e.g., the District of Columbia, Virginia, Maryland, and perhaps New York).
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E. The Constitution’s Answer: Congressional Impeachment
Although a President who engages in unlawful unofficial conduct may
not be subject to prosecution until leaving office, the President is always
subject to impeachment under Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution.145
This political process is available to members in Congress who, for reasons
of fairness, believe it is essential that the President be held accountable for
wrongdoing while in office.146 Conduct that appears to be aimed at
obstructing the search for truth, such as making false statements to
investigators, are the types of high crimes and misdemeanors that may
constitute grounds for impeachment and removal.147 If the House of
Representatives feels strongly enough, members may certainly try to
impeach the President for unofficial acts that appear to be criminal in
nature.148 Impeachment is a rare occurrence—but, as discussed above, the
alternative of prosecuting a sitting President raises serious separation of
powers issues by placing the power to decide who is President into the hands
of the judiciary.149 Even some commentators who believe that a sitting
President can be prosecuted in office agree that, as a matter of prudence, it
is preferable to first allow Congress to study the matter as a basis for
impeachment and removal proceedings before advancing with a criminal
prosecution.150 This is not to suggest that the President could avoid criminal
liability altogether if impeached. Under Article I, Section 3 of the
Constitution, once impeached by the House, convicted by the Senate, and
removed from office, a former President can be subject to indictment, trial,
judgment, and punishment according to law.151
145. “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
146. Alexander Hamilton illustrated the grave yet necessary task prescribed to Congress:
A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than
difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subject of [the Senate’s]
jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with
peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they related chiefly to injuries done
immediately to the society itself.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
147. See Hemel & Posner, supra note 19, at 1306 (surveying several congressional opinions that
President Clinton’s obstruction of justice was impeachable).
148. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; see generally 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.10 (5th ed. 2012).
149. See 1998 Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 80, at 6 (statement of Senator Robert G. Torricelli)
(“In my own interpretation, it would seem to me to mean that offenses by a President of the United States
are to the body public in its entirety, and therefore need to be judged not as narrow abuses against the
criminal law but against the body politic, sitting in judgment the U.S. Senate.”).
150. See, e.g., id. at 3–4 (statement of Senator John Ashcroft) (claiming that the sitting President
is subject to prosecution but that “prudence dictates that a prosecutor should defer to Congress when
impeachment is an option”).
151. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3.
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Some may worry that, if the President cannot be prosecuted for
wrongdoings committed while in office, then there is nothing to prevent him
or her from committing such acts. To the contrary, several mechanisms exist
to discourage the President from engaging in what would be criminal
behavior, including: checks and balances by other federal branches of
government, prosecution after leaving office, state sovereign power
afforded by the U.S. Constitution, media scrutiny and attention, the
President’s desire to preserve his or her reputation in history, and the desire
to win re-election.152
II. PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE
Even when a President is not the direct target or subject of a criminal
investigation, he or she may have information that is relevant to the
inquiry.153 There are numerous historical examples of presidents voluntarily
providing evidence to assist in an investigation; in other instances, their
participation has been motivated by the threat of subpoena.154 However,
there is little judicial precedent that answers the question of whether a
President who refuses to provide evidence can be compelled to do so and
under what circumstances.
During his criminal trial for conspiracy in 1807, Vice President Burr
asserted that President Jefferson had a letter in his possession that would
exculpate Burr from these charges.155 Over the President’s objections, Chief
Justice John Marshall rejected arguments that a sitting President was not
subject to compulsory process, and he issued a subpoena to the President,
152. See generally Ronald Brownstein, The Formidable Checks and Balances Imposing on
President Trump, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02
/trump-constraints-opposition/516825/ [https://perma.cc/J838-GQ4A].
153. This Article’s discussion proceeds in Part II on an assumption that the President’s production
of evidence takes place in a context where he or she is a nonparty witness and not the “target” of an
investigation. See Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2157 (noting that such investigations would be highly
politicized); see also Liptak, supra note 20 (President Nixon named as unindicted co-conspirator). This
distinction is important in two ways. First, it distinguishes between the President testifying as a nonparty
witness and the President testifying as a criminal defendant, the latter of which is a topic more closely
related to the discussion of presidential immunity from investigation, indictment, and prosecution. See
supra Part I. Second, it recognizes the potential Fifth Amendment rights that the President would have
against self-incrimination vis-à-vis the compelled production of incriminating evidence. See generally
Leonard G. Ratner, Executive Privilege, Self Incrimination, and the Separation of Powers Illusion, 22
UCLA L. Rev. 92 (1974) (thoroughly examining the implications of United States v. Nixon on Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights). Since the question is whether a court can compel the President to
testify or otherwise produce evidence, it is further assumed that in order for this constitutional question
to be resolved, the President would assert all rights in his or her favor, challenging a subpoena until the
Supreme Court grants certiorari to review the issue.
154. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 148, at § 7.1 (listing 16 voluntary and involuntary
appearances of Presidents before courts as witnesses).
155. Id. at 1000.
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directing that he turn over the letter.156 President Jefferson turned over the
letter to the government, but his act was largely voluntary in that he retained
control over when, where, and how he would produce the letter, to which
Chief Justice Marshall acquiesced.157
Similarly, in 1998, Independent Counsel Ken Starr directed a grand jury
to issue a subpoena to President Clinton for testimony relating to the
Whitewater and Lewinsky investigations.158 The subpoena prompted
negotiations between Starr and the President’s legal team, and resulted in
the President’s agreeing to testify voluntarily before the grand jury, rather
than under legal compulsion. In exchange, Starr agreed to withdraw the
subpoena.159
While the 1973 OLC Opinion and the 2000 OLC Opinion appear to draw
a clear line against criminal prosecution of a sitting President, the opinions
do not directly address other types of criminal process, such as compelled
oral testimony. The 1973 OLC Opinion discusses the fact that President
Jefferson did not want to appear in person in the Burr Trial, but it does not
conclude that he did not have to.160 It simply points out that the courts have
always given great deference to the President’s time and schedule.161 The
2000 OLC Opinion goes further still, speaking about the U.S. Supreme
Court Case of United States v. Nixon and constitutional balancing.162
Nowhere do either of the two OLC opinions say explicitly that the President
is immune from all criminal process.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for
Congress and provides policy and legal analyses to committees and
members of both the House and Senate. The CRS is viewed as nonpartisan,
and its work is considered credible by members from both major political
parties. In May 2018, the CRS released a memorandum entitled
“Compelling Presidential Compliance with a Judicial Subpoena” (the “CRS
Report”), which examines the history of presidents responding to judicial
subpoenas and various cases relating to presidential immunity from

156. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
157. John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential
Power, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1435, 1452–53 (1999). The nature of the Jefferson subpoena is significant.
While some commentators suggest that the subpoena was a subpoena ad testificandum for oral
testimony, it was most likely a subpoena duces tecum for the production of a letter. Id. at 1447. If this is
true, it significantly weakens any argument claiming that the Burr case is dispositive of the current issue
of a sitting President’s compelled oral testimony.
158. 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 148, at § 7.1(c)(viii).
159. Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt, Clinton Agrees to Testify on Videotape for Starr, WASH. POST,
July 30, 1998, at A1, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/star
r073098.htm [https://perma.cc/S56B-B7GW].
160. 1973 OLC MEMO, supra note 60, at 22.
161. Id.
162. 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 241.
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compulsory process.163 The CRS Report concluded that the applicable
judicial cases establish two important principles:
First, with regard to accountability, it is clear that the President is not
absolutely immune from all judicial compulsory process. The Court
has “unequivocally and emphatically endorsed” the principle that the
President may be made to comply with a criminal subpoena for
documentary evidence, and that he is subject to civil proceedings for
unofficial acts. Second, the President is not to be treated like any
other official, thus the Constitution prevents the courts from
subjecting the President to judicial requirements that impede him
from carrying out his Article II duties in violation of the separation
of powers. For this reason, the President is not subject to civil suits
for damages in cases arising from his official acts.164
The balancing approach embraced by the CRS is consistent with the
views of former Solicitor General Ted Olson.165 After reminding us that
there is no precedent on the issue, Mr. Olson explains that although the
President is unique, he is not above the law—that is, sometimes the
President must comply with judicial process.166 Regarding a request for oral
testimony, Olson speaks in terms of a presumption privilege:
While the President’s presumptive privilege against compulsive
testimony would be entitled to considerable deference, that claim
could be overcome if the prosecutor makes a strong case showing that
he must have specific essential evidence that is not procurable from
other sources and that he is not simply engaged in a fishing
expedition.167
If a President can be compelled to provide testimony in a civil case, then
surely one might argue that the President can be compelled to do so in more
serious proceedings, such as criminal trials, which often implicate matters
of greater public interest than private damage claims.168 Furthermore,
because discovery often takes more time in civil cases than criminal cases,
some commenters claim that Jones should be dispositive on the issue of
163. CRS REPORT, supra note 13, at 1–2.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Theodore B. Olson, Mueller v. Trump, WEEKLY STANDARD, May 18, 2018, https://www.we
eklystandard.com/theodore-b-olson/mueller-v-trump [https://perma.cc/FHH5-UJHP].
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982) (“When judicial action is needed to
serve broad public interests—as when the Court acts . . . to vindicate the public interest in an ongoing
criminal prosecution . . . —the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted.”).
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providing evidence in a criminal case because civil cases often take more
time than criminal cases in terms of discovery.169 However, it is important
to note (as does the CRS Report) that while permitting the civil suit to
proceed in Jones, the Court there clearly avoided the question of compelled
presidential testimony.170
On May 17, 2018, Professor Ryan Goodman interviewed Professor
Douglas W. Kmiec, the former Assistant Attorney General and head of the
OLC, concerning an unpublished OLC opinion (the “1988 OLC Opinion”)
that appears to be at odds with the CRS Report’s conclusion that a President
may sometimes be subject to criminal process.171 Professor Kmiec stated
that the 1988 OLC Opinion, cited in footnote 29 of the 2000 OLC Opinion,
stood for the proposition that the President was immune from all criminal
process, including both direct prosecution, and the compelled production of
documents and oral testimony.172 In his interview with Professor Goodman,
Professor Kmiec explains that the
OLC has concluded that a sitting President may not be indicted and
is immune from criminal process, including a subpoena. When
Assistant Attorney General Moss in the 2000 opinion refers to
immunity from “indictment and prosecution,” I believe him to be
using the word “prosecution” to include all the regular means of
prosecution – e.g, demands for testimony documentation, etc.173
With respect, Professor Kmiec’s assertion is questionable for the
following reasons. First, this assertion would appear to be contradicted by
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, where the Court affirmed that the separation of powers
does not require presidential immunity from all compulsory judicial
process.174 That case clearly informs us that a President can be compelled
to produce documentary evidence.175 Second, even if Professor Kmiec’s
interpretation of the 1988 OLC Opinion were accurate, the opinion would
only reflect the formal position of the Justice Department until it was
preempted or withdrawn; the 2000 OLC Opinion would clearly override the
1988 OLC Opinion and be the operative Department of Justice guidance on
this question today.176 At best, the 1988 OLC Opinion may be read to mean
169. Chaiken, supra note 81.
170. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1997); CRS REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.
171. See Douglas W. Kmiec & Ryan Goodman, The Missing Justice Dep’t Memo on Whether a
President Can Be Subpoenaed to Testify in a Criminal Case, JUST SECURITY (May 17, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/56398/kmiec-memo-missing-office-legal-counsel-opinion-Presidentsubpoenaed-testify-criminal-case/ [https://perma.cc/CY33-W82K].
172. Id.; see 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 253 n.29.
173. Kmiec & Goodman, supra note 171.
174. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
175. See generally id.
176. See OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM, RE: BEST
PRACTICES FOR OLC LEGAL ADVICE AND WRITTEN OPINIONS 2 (2010).
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that although the President is immune from prosecution, he or she is not
necessarily totally immune from the production of evidence based upon the
vital need for information in connection with a criminal proceeding.
One point is fairly certain—courts draw a clear line of distinction
between providing documents and giving oral testimony.177 There appears
to be less protection for a President from having to provide written
documents relevant to a criminal investigation.178 We know from United
States v. Nixon that under certain limited circumstances, the President can
be compelled to turn over documentary evidence essential in a criminal
prosecution.179
In reviewing case law, opinions from the Justice Department, and
writings from commentators and former government officials, it appears
that with respect to the production of documents, the courts will likely apply
a balancing test, one that balances the needs for justice against the needs of
the President to discharge presidential duties and faithfully execute the
law.180 It seems certain that the President, under certain circumstances, will
be required to provide documentary testimony when the testimony is
relevant, necessary, and otherwise unavailable.181 Even then, however, he
or she may refuse to provide documentary evidence by asserting executive
privilege based on legitimate national security, diplomatic, or military
concerns.182 Whether a President can be compelled to provide oral
177. See CRS REPORT, supra note 13, at 2 (“[T]he formal executive branch position has drawn a
clear distinction between judicial subpoenas for documents and those for testimony.”). Note the
difference in treatment between President Nixon’s compelled subpoena duces tecum, which required
him to turn over the tapes and relinquish all control of them until the conclusion of an in camera
inspection, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, and President Clinton’s compelled oral deposition,
which gave deference to the President in deciding the time and place of the videotaped testimony,
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1997).
178. This is due largely in part to concerns about the President’s ability to tend to his or her official
duties. It arguably takes less of the President’s time to relinquish documents than it does to appear in
person and testify, which would also involve the time to prepare for oral testimony. See Rhonda
Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REV. 37, 95 (1989).
179. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713.
180. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982) (courts “must balance the constitutional
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the
Executive Branch”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711–12 (1974) (weighing “the importance of
the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the President’s
responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice”);
2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 226 (quoting 1973 OLC MEMO, supra note 60, at 24) (courts should
“find the proper balance between the normal functions of the courts and the special responsibilities and
functions of the Presidency”); CRS REPORT, supra note 13, at 2 (case law “reflect[s] a delicate balancing
of two countervailing principles: accountability . . . and executive branch independence”); Olson, supra
note 165 (describing a presumptive privilege that can be overcome by a strong showing of relevance and
need).
181. See Olson, supra note 165.
182. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
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testimony presents a more difficult question; in large part, this is due to the
significant time and attention the President would need to expend in order
to prepare for and give oral testimony—time when the President is forced
to step away from his or her constitutionally-assigned duties.183
In criminal cases where oral testimony is sought from the President, the
prosecution must overcome a heightened burden of need and relevance,
demonstrating to the court that the evidence is necessary and unavailable
elsewhere. However, even in those situations where the prosecution meets
a heightened burden, given the serious duties of the President, the courts
will likely afford the President great latitude and discretion with respect to
the time, place, and manner of providing such oral testimony.184 For
example, the President would most likely not be required to give testimony
in court or before a grand jury.185 Given the demands of his or her schedule,
the President would also likely be allowed to provide written answers to
interrogatories or give a taped interview or deposition from the White
House.186
Finally, we must remember that while the President may be immune
from criminal prosecution while in office—and enjoy some immunity with
respect to providing evidence—the President is not immune from
impeachment.187 Consequently, if the President provides evidence, he or she
must be truthful or else risk a perjury offense.188 As noted earlier, lying
before a grand jury or before federal prosecutors is the type of high crime
and misdemeanor that might support charges of impeachment and
subsequent removal from office.189
III. PRESIDENTIAL SELF-PARDONS
As of the publication of this Article, President Trump has demonstrated
little hesitation to exercise his constitutional power of clemency.190 In
183. Such time and attention are generally “required to prepare for trial, including the time
required to meet with counsel, travel to and from the courthouse, and testify or wait to testify. Almost
all of the burdens a nonparty witness bears are universal.” Wasserman, supra note 178, at 95.
184. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1997).
185. See id.
186. See Kavanaugh, supra note 21, at 1460 (“Having seen first-hand how complex and difficult
that job is, I believe it vital that the President be able to focus on his never-ending tasks with as few
distractions as possible.”).
187. Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 18–20.
188. Perjury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The act or an instance of a person’s
deliberately making material false or misleading statements while under oath.”).
189. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; see generally Hemel & Posner, supra note 19.
190. See, e.g., @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (June 4, 2018, 5:35 AM), https://twitter.com/realdon
aldtrump/status/1003616210922147841?lang=en [https://perma.cc/4RRG-PDXW] (“As has been stated
by numerous legal scholars, I have the absolute right to PARDON myself, but why would I do that when
I have done nothing wrong?”); John Wagner, Trump Says He Has ‘Absolute Right’ to Pardon Himself
of Federal Crimes but Denies Any Wrongdoing, WASH. POST (June 4, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/trump-says-he-has-absolute-right-to-pardon-himself-of-federal-crimes-but-denies-an
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connection with periodic reports that he is preparing to grant a large number
of additional pardons, speculation abounds about whether a President has
the authority to issue a self-pardon.191 Although this is a question that has
not been squarely addressed in our courts,192 many scholars and historians
believe such an attempted exercise of power is inconsistent with the
traditions of United States law and our founding principles.193
Clemency is an “act of grace” by the sovereign.194 The federal pardon
power lies exclusively with the President, and Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly limits that power in only two regards: (1) the
pardonable offense must be a federal law offense, and (2) the pardon power
cannot be used in cases of impeachment.195 Importantly, the Constitution
does not speak to self-pardons. Since the Constitution expressly limits the
pardon power in certain ways but does not expressly forbid self-pardons,
the courts may well conclude that a President has the power to grant a selfpardon. The text of the Constitution simply allows no other reasonable
conclusion—there is no bar to self-pardons.196 As such, it is immaterial
whether a self-pardon is issued for criminal conduct before or after
assuming office.197
Those who share the opposing view argue that a self-pardon places the
President above the law.198 Finding no express support in the words of the
Constitution, critics retreat to the old adage that “no man should be the judge
in his own case.”199 However, if the law does not prohibit the practice, then
arguably the President does not place himself above the law with a selfpardon, just as no one else is placed above the law when they receive a
y-wrongdoing/2018/06/04/3d78348c-67dd-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html [https://perma.cc/X7
UU-Y97W].
191. See Adam Liptak, How Far Can Trump Go in Issuing Pardons?, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/us/politics/pardons-trump.html, [https://perma.cc/7RTC-89A9].
192. Cf. Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal
Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 199 (1999).
193. See Tribe, Painter & Eisen, supra note 5 (arguing that a self-pardon would violate the
Constitution’s “broad precept against self-dealing”).
194. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833); see Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me?:
The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 804 (1996).
195. “[H]e shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United
States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
196. See Turley, supra note 5 (nothing textually bars the President from pardoning himself);
contra Kalt, supra note 194, at 782 (arguing for the unconstitutionality of self-pardons).
197. Kalt, supra note 194, at 780 (“Pardons can be granted at any time after a crime has been
committed . . . .”).
198. Id. at 809.
199. See, e.g., MARY C. LAWTON, MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL, Presidential or Legislative Pardon of the President, 1 SUPP. OP. O.L.C. 370, 370 (1974),
https://www.justice.gov/file/20856/download (“Under the fundamental rule that no one may be a judge
in his own case, the President cannot pardon himself.”); Kalt, supra note 194, at 809.
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pardon from the Chief Executive.200 In these instances, the recipient of the
pardon escapes the usual consequences of criminal wrongdoing that are
imposed by law. Furthermore, when granting a pardon, the President is not
acting as a judge to adjudicate guilt or innocence. A judge has no authority
to grant a pardon; the pardon power is an executive power, one expressly
reserved to the Chief Executive.201
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution requires the President to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.202 Some opponents of self-pardons
contend that Section 3 establishes a trust with the American people that is
violated if the President grants a self-pardon.203 But if in granting a selfpardon the President violates the trust of the American people, then he or
she arguably violates that trust each time a pardon is granted to someone
who has taken an oath to faithfully execute the laws of the United States but
has then failed to faithfully follow the law.204 So long as the President does
not grant a pardon for a non-federal offense or in cases of impeachment, the
President is arguably faithfully executing the law.205
Our Founders fought a revolutionary war to escape the tyranny of a
British king. They established a government in which power is intentionally
dispersed between three co-equal branches.206 The suggestion that in
drafting a constitution they intended to vest power in the Chief Executive to
pardon himself from criminal abuses of power seems counterintuitive.
However, having just experienced the unfettered discretion of a king, they
surely must have been sensitive to the potential abuse of the pardon
200. See Kalt, supra note 194, at 788 (contending that power to pardon does not place the
President above the law).
201. See Turley, supra note 5 (President acts in a political, not judicial, capacity when granting
pardons).
202. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
203. See Jed Shugerman & Ethan J. Leib, This Overlooked Part of the Constitution Could Stop
Trump from Abusing His Pardon Power, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/opinions/this-overlooked-part-of-the-constitution-could-stop-trump-from-abusing-his-pardon-power
/2018/03/14/265b045a-26dd-11e8-874b-d517e912f125_story.html [https://perma.cc/UNW6-MXDQ]
(arguing President would violate duty to faithfully execute the laws by issuing a self-pardon).
204. See Scott Ingram, Presidents, Politics, and Pardons: Washington’s Original (Mis?)Use of
the Pardon Power, 8 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 259, 317 (2018) (arguing that “[w]e need to scrutinize
pardons more thoroughly to understand their motivations”). Ingram argues that the pardon power as used
in American presidential practice has rarely been used for one reason alone. See id. Furthermore, Ingram
contends that among the motivations, policy is often paramount—but that such policy considerations are
not necessarily a misuse of the pardon power, for “[i]t is better to have a pardon policy than to randomly
award policies for no reason.” Id. While Ingram does not mention self-pardons in his article, his
historical analysis suggests that popular concern for self-pardons is not so much driven by morality as it
is politics: “What Washington’s pardon practice tells us is that pardons have always been tinged with
political considerations.” Id. at 316.
205. Nida & Spiro, supra note 192, at 220 (“Therefore, the President may exercise the pardon
power for anyone—including himself—except in cases of impeachment.”).
206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether or one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
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power.207 The Founders could have easily drafted the Constitution to
prohibit self-pardons; perhaps they did not do so because they viewed the
possibility of a self-pardon to be so absurd that they did not think it worth
addressing.208 Alternatively, it is possible that they believed all wrongdoing
by a President should be addressed through the political process of
impeachment, which falls outside the scope of the pardon power.209
How the courts would rule on the legality of a self-pardon is unclear. It
would depend in large measure on how judges understand their role in
interpreting the Constitution and on their views of the scope of presidential
immunity.210 If the President commits a federal crime, issues a self-pardon,
and either resigns or is impeached, the President effectively escapes federal
criminal liability for the offense.211 This may seem unfair, but being forced
to forfeit the office of the presidency is itself a serious penalty.212 Many
historians and scholars would likely judge a self-pardon with contempt, and
the former President would still be subject to state criminal liability.
Whatever the legal authority, a self-pardon would send tremors throughout
Congress and likely unsettle many law-abiding Americans.213 While the
President may have the power to self-pardon, this is almost certainly a
circumstance where it would be wiser not to test the limits of executive
power.
CONCLUSION
At the conclusion of his investigation, Special Counsel Robert Mueller
will likely present his findings and recommendations to his supervisor, the
207. See Kalt, supra note 194, at 782–84 (describing the English roots and royal abuses of the
pardon power).
208. Id. at 782–83.
209. At the Constitutional Convention, Edmund Randolph moved to “except in cases of treason”
from the pardon power because “[t]he President may himself be guilty.” Records of the Federal
Convention (Sept. 15, 1787), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 5 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 2000). James Wilson opposed the motion, arguing that the impeachment power provided a
sufficient process by which such presidential abuses could be kept in check. Id. Ultimately, Randolph’s
motion lost by a vote of 8-2, and the language was omitted. Id.
210. The Court has exhibited a wide range of opinions on presidential immunity. Compare Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982) (absolute civil damages immunity for official conduct), with
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694–95 (1997) (no civil damages immunity for unofficial conduct).
211. See infra Appendix A.
212. See Granting Pardon to Richard Nixon, 39 Fed. Reg. 32601 (Sept. 18, 1974) (President Ford
choosing not to further expose former President Nixon “to further punishment and degradation” after he
had “already paid the unprecedented penalty of relinquishing the highest elective office of the United
States”).
213. Due to the potential outcry, one scholar has proposed a constitutional amendment to exclude
use of the pardon power “for the President’s Spouse, Children, Siblings, Parents, or Self.” Nida & Spiro,
supra note 192, at 221.
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Deputy Attorney General.214 If the Special Counsel concludes the evidence
supports a finding that the President engaged in criminal wrongdoing
outside his official duties, the Justice Department will have to determine
whether or not to stand with the previous OLC conclusions that a criminal
prosecution must be deferred until the President no longer holds office.215 It
is possible, assuming the facts support it, that the Department will modify
its legal conclusion and allow Special Counsel Mueller to prosecute the
President under the theory that while a President cannot be prosecuted for
erroneous decisions when exercising clear presidential authority or
performing official acts,216 a President can be subject to criminal liability
for unofficial acts—actions while in office that are unrelated to presidential
duties and that are motivated by personal or political gain.217 It is also
possible that leadership in the Department of Justice will conclude, as did
Mr. Jaworski and Mr. Starr,218 that a sitting President can be prosecuted for
unofficial acts, and yet, like Jaworski and Starr, decide first to let
congressional impeachment proceedings play out as the more prudent and
appropriate course.219
Undoubtedly, any indictment would be challenged by the President
based on the reasons articulated in previous OLC opinions.220 A legal
challenge based on conduct arguably not associated with political fitness
would place the courts in the difficult role of evaluating and potentially
second-guessing actions, decisions, and statements historically reserved to
the discretion and political judgment of the elected branches. As discussed
earlier, one can predict the difficulty in formulating a clear rule to determine
the dividing line between unofficial acts subject to prosecution and those
that are not because they constitute official acts.221 The outcome of such a
constitutional battle is unclear; however, unelected judges would be wise to
tread carefully since their involvement could set the nation on a path that
214. 28 C.F.R. § 600.6–.8 (2018).
215. 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 238.
216. This is the primary theory underlying the Supreme Court decision in Fitzgerald, granting
absolute immunity for civil damages suits to the President for official conduct. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731, 754 (1982).
217. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 685–86 (1997) (President Clinton’s conduct prior to
entering office “unrelated to any of his official duties as President of the United States”).
218. It should be noted that Special Prosecutor Jaworski and Independent Counsel Starr operated
under a different statutory scheme than that of the current investigation by Special Counsel Mueller.
These different legal scenarios likely affected their conclusions. See, e.g., ROTUNDA MEMO, supra note
33, at 2 (“Nor do I consider whether the President could be indicted if there were no Independent Counsel
statute.”).
219. JAWORSKI STAFF MEMO, supra note 100, at 20; ROTUNDA MEMO, supra note 34, at 55.
220. For example, the President might argue that the burden of responding to criminal process is
much greater than participating in civil litigation and thus constitutes an unconstitutional disruption of
his duties. See 2000 OLC MEMO, supra note 58, at 260 (reaffirming the OLC’s position stated in the
1973 OLC Memo that “indictment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President would unduly interfere
with the ability of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned duties”).
221. See supra Section I.A.
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ends with the conviction and subsequent removal of a democraticallyelected President.222
Even if the Department of Justice continues to stand behind its current
position that it will defer prosecution for criminal unofficial conduct, there
are legitimate reasons the Special Counsel should continue his
investigation.223 The most obvious is that the Department of Justice may
decide to prosecute the President once he is out of office. A better reason to
continue the investigation is that other individuals not cloaked with the same
immunity as the President may have engaged in wrongdoing.224 Indeed,
there have already been several indictments and plea agreements—as well
as a plea deal and conviction—arising out of the Special Counsel’s
investigation.225
Importantly, whether or not a President can be prosecuted, compelled to
provide evidence, or “self-pardoned,” we as a nation have to deal with the
reality—based on the sworn testimony and more recent public statements
of the heads of our intelligence community—that Russia interfered in the
2016 presidential election, and that they intend to interfere in future
American elections.226 The protection of our national security demands that
we understand fully the actions and methods of the Russian government,
and we must hold this adversary accountable. For this reason alone, the

222. Amar & Kalt, supra note 37, at 12 (“If the President were prosecuted, the steward of all the
People would be hijacked from his duties by an official of few (or none) of them.”).
223. In fact, President Donald Trump has reportedly made over two hundred arguments against
Special Counsel Mueller’s Russia investigation. See Ryan Teague Beckwith, Read the 209 Arguments
President Trump Has Made Against the Mueller Investigation, TIME, http://time.com/5290531/donaldtrump-robert-mueller-russia-investigation-arguments/ (last updated Aug. 14, 2018, 4:07 PM)
[https://perma.cc/4W7Y-X2U].
224. Furthermore, Special Counsel Mueller has been “authorized to prosecute federal crimes
arising from the investigation of these matters” as he “believes it is necessary and appropriate . . . .”
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL TO INVESTIGATE
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RELATED MATTERS, ORDER NO.
3915-2017 (2017). While there are legitimate reasons to conclude the investigation, if Mueller finds it
necessary to continue the investigation, he continues to have the authorization to do so until he decides
to conclude or is removed by the Attorney General for cause. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d) (2018).
225. See generally Devlin Barrett, Matt Zapotosky, Carol D. Leonnig & Shane Harris, For
Mueller, Pushing to Finish Parts of Russia Probe, Question of American Involvement Remains, WASH.
POST (July 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/mueller-pushing-towrap-up-parts-of-russia-probe-faces-question-of-american-involvement/2018/07/14/4bdcef90-87861e8-8f6c-46cb43e3f306_story.html [https://perma.cc/N5B9-4A8B]; see also Sharon LaFraniere &
Kenneth P. Vogel, Manafort Agrees to Help Mueller as Part of Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2018, at
A1.
226. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 1, at 1 (“We assess with
high confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at
the US presidential election, the consistent goals of which were to undermine public faith in the US
democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency.”).
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investigation by Special Counsel Mueller into Russian meddling in the 2016
election should be allowed to continue to its conclusion.
Finally, while the Special Counsel may not have the constitutional
authority to prosecute a sitting President who commits a crime, the
Department of Justice certainly has the power to refer the Special Counsel’s
findings and recommendations to Congress.227 If those findings include
serious criminal wrongdoing arising out of unofficial acts, it remains to be
seen whether Congress will hold the President accountable. The decision
whether to impeach and remove a sitting President will provide the toughest
test of our system of checks and balances since the days of Watergate.

227. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2017) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation
in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence
therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney
General.”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2018).
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APPENDIX A
Explanatory Hypotheticals
The following examples are hypothetical in nature only. Their purpose is to
apply the conclusions of this Article to real-world scenarios. Assume that the
President obstructs justice. Suppose further this act violates both state and
federal laws. Finally, assume it is unofficial conduct. Based on the
considerations and conclusions in this Article, here are six general scenarios
and their respective outcomes:
The President resigns. Without the shield of a pardon, the former President
would be completely exposed to criminal prosecution in both federal and state
courts, and since double jeopardy does not preclude federal and state
prosecutions for the same crime, the former President could be charged in both
for the same offense.
The President does nothing. The President could not be prosecuted until
out of office based on deferment. The President would be subject to
impeachment and removal from office. The former President would then be
completely exposed to criminal prosecution in both federal and state courts.
The President issues a self-pardon and stays in office. The President’s
pardon shields the President from criminal liability for federal crimes, but not
for state crimes. However, any state prosecution would be deferred. The
President would be subject to impeachment and removal from office. After
removal or the end of the President’s term in office, the former President could
be prosecuted by state courts.
The President issues a self-pardon and resigns. Again, the former
President would be immune from prosecution for federal crimes but not state
crimes. State prosecutors could still indict and prosecute the President.
The House impeaches the President; the President issues a self-pardon;
the Senate votes to remove. The President remains subject to removal from
office. Here, the pardon is likely void and unconstitutional because it is being
used in a case of impeachment. The President will be subject to prosecution in
federal and state courts following removal.
The House impeaches; the Senate votes not to remove; the President
issues a self-pardon. In this unlikely scenario, the President is impeached but
is not successfully removed. After the failed Senate vote, the President issues a
self-pardon. In this case, it could be argued that the impeachment event is over
once the case becomes congressionally moot, that is, after an unsuccessful
attempt by Congress to remove the President for the articles of impeachment
voted against the President. Since impeachment proceedings are not indefinite
(e.g., Clinton remained in office after the Senate failed to remove), they will
end, and the President can arguably issue a self-pardon. Again, the President
would remain exposed to state prosecution after the end of the term of office or
earlier resignation.
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